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In 
The Supreme Gourt 
of the 
State of Utah 
.STATE . OF UTAH EX REL 
GROVER A. GILES, ATTORNEY 
GEKER.A.L FOR STATE Q:F UTA.H, 
Plajnti.ff, 
' 




This action is in quo 'varranto by petition or com-
plaint filed in this Court by the State on relation 
of the attorney p-Pneral seeking to vacate the office 
of Justice of thr PearP of the Fourth Pre-cinet of 
~fagna~ 1Jtah held by the defendant, T. E. Burke, 
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convicted of a felony, and to require him to sur-
render the office. 
The facts are undisputed. The defendant was elect-
t3d to the office November 8, 1938, duly quaJitied to 
hold the office January 2, 1~39, and ever since di8- j~ 
(jharged the duties of the office, and was and still ~ 
is in possession of the office. May 14, 1940 an in- ... 
forn1ation, under · ' ,::(1 
Title 103, Chapter 25, Section 1, R. S. L. 
1933, 
'vas filed in the district court in and for Salt Lake 
County, charging the defendant with the crime or 
offenRe of g'antbling - a felony under the statute. 
On trial, he on .A.pril 8, 1941 'vas found guilty and on 
April 12, 1941 was by the district court s~utenced 
to an indeterminate tenn in the State prison ot 
-utah. 
From that judgment the defendant prosecuted a 
proper appeal to this Court. .April 14, 1940 a cer-
tificate of probable cause "'as granted by the dis-
trict court, and pending the appeal, he was released 
fron1 custody on his own reeo~1iznnce, and at no 
time under the judgment 'vas confined or imprison-
ed, or otherwise restrained of his liberty. That 
case on appeal is still pending in this Court. 
To the petition filed by the attorney general the 
defendant interposed a demurrer and motion to 
strike, as more particularly ·appears on the record 
and files in the cause. The attorney .general, to 
support his petition ,or eom,plaint, pre-pared and 
served a brief. V ariouR grounds are urged by him 
in support thereof. It is ~ot urged or claimed that 
the commission of the offense of "Thieh the defend-
ant ,~.,-.as eonvicted and sentenced, '\\ras connected 
with or r~el·ated to or grew out of the office held by 
the defendant, or was committed in the perform· 
ance of duties with respeet thereto. 
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3 
ARGUMENT 
~ POINT I. 
~-~~ The first point made by him is 'vith respect to 
--. Section 103-1-35, R. S. 1933. 
The section is as follows : 
~·A sentence of imprisonment in the State 
prison for any term less than for life sus-
pends all civil rights of the person so sen-
tenced during such imprisonment, and for-
feits all private trusts and all public offi-
ces, authority or po'\\rer.'' 
Considerable space is devoted by eounst:l in his brief 
as to the meaning of the 'vords ''conviction'' and 
·'sentence.'' That the defendant in the criminal 
case \vas "convicted'' and \ras "sentenced" to the 
~tate prison, may readily he eonceded. If not so, 
the appeal of the defendant \vould be wholly fruit-
less. "\V e thus need not devote any consideration to 
that part of the brief. But let it be conceded that 
the real point made by counsel under that statute 
li~s deeper. 'Vhat counsel more particularly urges 
is that because of the language, ''A sentence of inl-
prisonment in the State prison,'' etc., a forfeiture 
of the office held by the defendant by operation of 
law and as a necessary ~onsequence resulted im-
mediately upon th~ eon·viction and sentence of the 
defendant of the charged felony in the criminal case, 
and that the appeal taken by him did not avoid the 
hnmediate effect of such result. 
Counsel cites many cases whieh he claims support 
f.:uch view. On an examination of the cases so 
cited, it will be fonnd that thP '~eciRions in each and 
all of them 'vere rendererl under constitutional or 
Rtntntory provjsions materially different fron1 the 
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Utah ~tatute referred to, in that the constitution or 
.statute of such ~tates provided that a public office 
held by an incumbent became vacant or was fur~ 
J G~tted merely upon "·a conviction of the incumbent 
of a felony." We submit the Utah statute 1s.not to 
the effect that a public office of an incumbent is 
\Tae;ated or for1e1ted. on a "Inere convicti,on" of a 
felony, but that under the Utah statute to 1orteit a 
public office held by an incumbent requires not 
only a oonvictton and a sentence of irnpr1~onn1ent 
in the State prison, hut also an imprisonment 
a.s well. To say that the Utah statute n1eans no 
more than the statutes of other sta.tes providing. that 
a mere conviction of a felony by an incu1nbent in 
office vaeates and forfeits the office, is to ignore 
and not to give effeet to n1urh lang·uage contained 
in the Utah statute. If the legislature intended that 
a mere conviction of a felony forfeited all private 
rrusts and all public office held by an incumbent, 
the le.gtj_slature would have sajd so. It did not do 
that. Thus the numerous cases cited on the subject 
by counsel for the State are not app1icai:J1e. 
This brings us to a further consideration or i11ter-
pretation, or more particularly, the application of 
the Utah statute itself. We do not find, nor does 
the State cite, any case from this jurisdiction con-
Htruiug or applying the statute. In co1n~tdering it. 
let it not be confused 'vith Chapter 7, 105-7-13, 
rel·ating to removal of offieers hv judicial prqceed-
ings, and 'vhere it is expressly provided that "upon 
a conviction" of remova.I, the court "must pro-
nounce judgment that the defendant he re1noved 
from office,;' and while there is p·rovided that an 
appeal may he taken from the judgment of removal, 
vet it further is there expressly provided that ''un-
til such judgment is reversed the defendant shall ~le 
suspended from his office,'' and ''pending- the 
appeal, the .offire muRt he filled as in case of a 
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vacancy.'' There are several cases from this juris-
diction involving the application of the removal 
statute, notably the cases of 
Parker v. Morgan, 48 Utah 408; 160 Pac. 
764. 
Burke v. Knox, 59 Utah 596. 
lt is readily seen that by the ren1:oval statute, a 
''mere conviction'' directly and expressly ''ousted 
the defendant from office'' until the judgment of 
removal was reversed, and that pending~ the appeal, 
the office 'vas to be filled a~ in case of vacancy. But 
the removal statute and the statute under consider-
ation, 103-1-35, are in no sense analogous. 
Should it be argued that the phrase or language of 
the statute, ''a sentence of imprisonment in the 
State prison,''. is broader and more comprehensive 
than the language in other States providing that a 
''mere conviction" of a felony vacated the office 
of an incumbent and forfeited all rights to the office, 
or that the word ''sentencen necessai.:ilY implies a 
conviction, we say such language or phrase never-
theless must be considered in connef~tion \vith the 
further language o.f- the section, ''during sue-h im-
prisoninent, '' language not found in statutes of 
other States under which the decisions in the cited 
caseR 'vere rendered. The language or phrase, 
''during such imprisonment,'' must be given due 
effect in considering and construing the section in 
question. It ma.y not be ignored, as is done by 
counsel for the State. We regard it a material 
factor in considering and construing the s-ection in 
question. 
1 t iR claimed our sta.tute is the same as the Cali ... 
fornia. statute. 'rhe statute as it appears in the 
R.evised Statutes of Utah, 1933, is the same as con-
tained in 
ron1piled Laws of Utah, 1917, Sec. 8fl:t;_ 
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There the California statute is noted, as ''Cal. Pen. 
(j .• ,. Sec. 673, \' but let it .be observed that a star i~ 
placerl after the figuves 673, indicating that tho 
California statute is different from the Utah stat-
ute, or that the Utah statute is not like the Cali-
fornia statute. And so it is not, for the California 
statute uses the phrase "conviction of a fel,ony," 
and on1its the words '.'during such imprisoilment." 
N eve.rt~eles.s counsel for the State cites and says 
that the case of 
~IeKannay v. llortorn, 151 Cal. 711; 91 Pac. 
598, 
is on all fours with the case in· hand. \Ve dispute 
that. In the California case, the charter of the con-
solidated city and county of San Francisco pro. 
vided that 
''an office becomes vacant 'vhen the in-
cumbent thereof dies, resig·ns, is adjudged 
insane, convicted of a felony, or of an 
offense involvjng a. violation of his offi-
cial dutirs." (Italics added). 
The Court stated that the political code of Cali-
fornia was the same. Eugene Schmitz) 'vhile 1nayor 
of the city of San Francisco, '' "ras found guilty of 
a felony - the crime of extortion- by the verdict 
. :of a jury,'' and was sentenced by the court to a. term 
·of imp~risonment for five years in the Sta.te prison 
·of Califiornia. A copy of the judgment and of the 
proceedings was transmitted to the hoard of super-
iVisors of the city, which declared a vacancy in the 
office and appointed Ed"rard Taylor as may;or . 
• John Boyle was secretarv to Schmitz at the time of 
. and pri~r and subs:eqt~ent to· the conviction of 
Schmitz, and Harry McKannay \Vas appointed sec 
reta.ry for T·aylor. 1\fcKanna:v. as clerk, presented 
a. claim tjo· Samuel Horton, auditor of San Fran-
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cisco, for salary due him. At the sante tin1e, Boyle 
presented a claim for salary due him for and dur .. 
ing the same period. The auditor, because of un-
certainty as to which of the clain1ants was entitled 
to the salary, refused to pay either. n!cKannay 
thereupon brought manda.mus against flortou, the 
audit.or, requiring him to pay the salary to Me .. 
l(annay. The alternative 'vrit granted \'fas 1nad~ 
permanent. The decision, of course, involved the 
question as to whether Schmitz or Taylor constitut-
ed the rightful incwubent to the office of mayor. 
1'he effect of the decision was that Taylor and not 
Schmitz, durin.g the period in question, was tho 
rightful incumbent to the office. Schmitz there-
upon appealed front the judgment o.f the Superior 
Court to the district court of appeals and in doing 
~o was granted a certificate of probable cause b;y 
the Superior Court but 'vas not admitted to hail 
pending the appeal. 
'V e think there are several distinct and different 
factors in the eases. As is seen under the Cali-
foriiia statute, the office ipso facto became vacant 
when an incumbent was convicted of a f·elony. But 
that, we submit, is not the legal effect of the Utah 
statute "'hen a11 its parts are considered togr~ther, 
as they must be. 
In the next place~ under thP California criminal pro .. 
cedure, an appeal by the defendant, though "rith a 
certificate of probable cause; but without being ad-
mitted to bail, does not rele·ase the defendant from 
nhysir.·al restraint and he is required to be kept in 
custody by the sheriff. The California. statute~ 
Penal Code, (Cal.), Sec. 1244, 
!n ~ncb particular~ i~ set forth in the opinion of the 
MrKa.nnay ~ase. Schmitz, notwithstanding his 
appPal, was thus phy~ically reRtrained by the sher-
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iff and was by him confined and held in custody in 
. the county jail, pendin~ the appeal. \Vith respect 
thereto, the Court. in the l\ic Kannay case said: 
' ' 
'' \\trhether a felony does or does no.t involve 
a violation of . official duty, the indi~t­
nlent \Vill eharge the factH conHtituting the 
felony, and a verdict of guilty 'vill impart 
a sentence of in1prisonment in tltc ·state 
prison, to be £xecuted at once, unless a stay 
of proceeding:s pendingo an appeal is ob-
tained through the n1edium of. a eertift· 
cate of probabte cause; and even iu tha~ 
c::1.se, the defendant i ~ committP.tl to clilse 
custody in the county jail to a\vait the re-
~ult of his appeal, unless the court,, in the 
exerci ~e of a discretion rarely exercised 
and only in exceptional cases, adntits him 
to bail. The r€sult is that a public officer 
convicted for a felony is placed by the ver-
dict in a position and under a physir.al re-
straint which preventR him from perform-
ing the duties of his office.'' 
In that connection, the Court further said that: 
'" SjncP a pri~oner in close custody cannot 
~dn1iniF-ter :1. public office, he cannot be 
allo,ved to stand in the way of the appoint-
ment of one who can perfonn its duties.~, 
Though it be as.sumed tha.t the court here ·was not 
in duty bound to admit the defendant to bail, still it 
cannot he g.ainsaid that the court had the power, 
jn the exercise. of its discretion, to do so. 
Section 105-44-5, R. S. 1933, 
of the code· of criminal procedure, provides that 
after conviction of an offense not punishable with 
death, a defendant may be admitted- to bail as a 
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matter of right when the a.ppeal is from a. judg-
ment imposing a fine only, and ''as a matter of dis-
cretion in all other cases.'' Let it be conceded tha.t 
when an incumbent. of a public Qffice is _physically 
1·estrained and actually confined in jail, that during 
~uch confinement or imprisornn1ent he necessarily 
is unable to and cannot perform the duties of the 
office, and hence it is necessary that another be 
appointed to do so. ·· 
J3ut no""' let the lTtah sta.t.nt.e 1·Pla.ting to an appeal 
in a criminal case be considered. It is Section 
105-40-9. The heading is ''Effect of Appeal by 
Defendant.'' It provides that: 
'' 
4 \n appeal to the Supre-me Court from a 
judgment or convict~on stays the execu-
tiOll of the judg1nent upon the filing 'vith 
the clerk of the oourt in 'vhich the convic-
tion "'"a.s had of a certificate of the judge 
of such court or of a juRtice of the Su-
preme Court that jn his op1n1on th<~re is 
probable cause for the appeal; but not 
otherwise.'' 
This statute when complied w·ith, as here it is, is a 
fundamental right of every defendant in a crim-
ina.! case and grants a s,tay of exe·_-·ution of the judg-
ment pending1 the apv~eal, whether the offense is a 
rnere mu;;demeanor or a felony when the penalty is 
not death. ''1hy under thP statute should a differ-
ent rule he applied, when the defendant is an in-
cumbent in public office 'vhen the ronuniss.ion of 
tl1~ offens~ in no parti(.';ula.r relates to or is con-
nected with or g-ro" .. s out of the charg-ed offense 
anrl when eommjtterl by a d~fendant 11ot in pnhlic 
office? The stat11te it~~lf m·flk€l·s no such d~s.1inction. 
lt is vain to point to the remov~1 sta.blte of nnhlic 
nffirPrR "rl1Prfl on eonvict.ion nnd a jn11.~mf\r't of re-
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1noval a Rtay of execution of the judg~nent pending 
the appeal is expressly denied. We assert there is 
no statute which directly or expressly denies a stay 
of execution of the judgment on appeal from a con-
viction and sentence of gambling. No such statute 
is pointed to by the State, except 103-1-35, but that 
statut~ does not say that no stay un appeal shall he 
granted an incumbent in public office convicted and 
sentenced for the commission of a felony. 
Such statute and the statute under which the de-
fendant was convicted and sentenced are in no 
sense in pari materia. Each relates to a distinct, 
separate and different subj9ct, and may not be read 
together to ascertain the legal effect of either. 
/jounsel n1ay say they do not contend that the stat-
utes are in pari n1ateria.; but the propo~:;ition ad-
vanced by them means just that. Of course, all de-
fendants whether in public office or not 'vhen final-
ly adjudged guilty of the commission of a felony 
forfeit all right to public office and private trusts; 
and when so finally determined the defendant is an 
Jncumbent in public office, be, of course, Inust 
vaca.te the same and surrender it up. But the ques-
tion here is, must he do so pend~ng an appeal time-
ly and properly taken to a proper court and beforr. 
the judgment appealed from is affirmed! 
It certainly seems a harsh rule, mthout direct or 
express legislative decree, that an incu1nbent in pub-
lic office convicted of a felony in no 'vi~e relating 
1 o or connecte-d with or growing out of his office 
and senteneed to imp·risonment, may not on a 
proper appeal have the execution of the judgment 
s.tayed to test the validity of the proceedings result-
ing in his conviction no rna tter how grievous and 
prejudicial errors during tl1P trial of his convic· 
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tion may have been OOinmitted or ho" scant or in-
sufficient the evidence against hhn ma.y be. · 
If it be the sense of the legislature to decree that 
an incumbent in public office convicted of a felony, 
whether related to his office or not and sentenced 
to imprisonn1ent in the State prison may not, not-
withstanding an appeal taken by him fron1 the judg-
ment; have a Rtay of execution of the judgment, 
pending the appeal, then let the legislature, by son1e 
direct and approp1iate language, say so, and not 
leave the matter open to suspend or modify a stay 
of execution under the general a.ppealing statute 
to meet exig·encie-s of a particular case. 
Counsel may say they do not dispute that an appeal 
taken as here stays ''the execution: -of the judg-
1l1ent ·' appealed from. They must· say it, -¥rhether 
thr~ ... do so or not. In portions of _their brief they 
in effect say that ·a forfeiture of the office is no 
part of the judgment, that the forfeiture is a mere 
consf'quence or result of the judgment. We recog-
nize some such loose language i~ used in some of 
the cited decisions involvin.g- constitutional or stat-
utory nrovisions different from ours. But when 
npplied to our statute, there is no logic in surh 
statement. If the ''execution of a. iudgn1ent'' is 
~tayed, of necessity all result~ and !lon~equences 
thPrPof nre ::ll~o ~tnved. If the judgment here 
annealed from i~ ~ffirmed, all of its consequences 
and results go with it. If the judgment i~ re,.. 
yP.rsed, ag·a.in all ih~ consequences and, results go 
with the revers·al. Tn other words. in either ca.se, 
tllfll ta.il a.nd hair p-o "vifh thP hjflp. 'rl1e anneRl here 
i~ from the convictio11 Rnd ~PntP:nre ~~ prononnced 
hv the court in thP rrin1inal !l.a.RP. The Rf'ntP.nce as 
so prornonnePcl (lf)l1Rtit11tP~ fhp iuil_gmpnt ::.nnea}Pil 
from. And if thnt. i~ a.ffirmed. Rll i ~ affirm PO· if 
rPVPrsPd, all i~ rPYPrRed. Su~h reRult rna~~ not he 
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12 
avoided, except to say that the appeal here did not 
"~tay the execution of the judgment." That we 
say, cannot be maintained without porinting to some 
express 'statute, as in case of the removal statute 
directly and expressly staying execution of th~ 
judgment pending the appeal. 
POINT II. 
The State further contends that the offense of 
gambling or operating a gambling place, under 
'fitle 103, Chapter 25, Section 1, constituted "mis-
conduct in office.'' To su·ppo.rt that, counsel par-
ticularly cite 
Section 103-1-17, R. S. 1933. 
The section is headed '' Felonious Miscond-uct iti 
Office Forfeits Office and Disqualifies.'' (Italics 
added). The section its·elf rea~s: 
''The conviction of any State, county, city, 
to,vn or precinct officer of a felony i'l'~vvlv­
ing rnisconduct in office, involves as a con-
sequence in addition to the punishment pre-
~cribPd by la." .. , a forfeiture of his office, 
and disqualifies him ever afterwards from 
holding any public office in this State.'' 
(Italics added). 
~As herein frequently stated, we aga.in remind the 
Court that it is not claimed that the felony of 
gambling or of operating a gambling place of which 
the defendant was convicted was in no 'vise related 
to or connected with or grew out of the defendant's 
office, or th·a t the commission of the felony result-
ed from any duties p,erformed by the defendant re-
jating to his office. It thus is difficult to see how 
the charged felony in any way ''involved miscon· 
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13 
duct ill office.'' Certainly it is not every felony an 
incun1bent may co1nmit which may be regarded nus-
conduct in office. In the ~lcKannay case hereto-
fore cited, it is recognized that • ·there are f elon.ies 
which involve no violation of official duty.'' It is 
apparent that must be so. The long· quot~ltion from 
46 C. J. 987 cited by counsel as to \Yhat constitutes 
nlisoonduct in office, in the \vindup it 1s expressly 
stated that the acts must be such ''as to runount to 
maladministration in office.'' A nu1nber ·of cases 
are cited by counsel wherein it is claimed that the 
operation of_ a gambling house and its inevitable 
inducement to gamble or the permitting of gambling 
by a public officer is misconduct in office.. But the 
cases cited do not support the proposition so broad-
ly stated. In the cited case of Etzler v. Bro"\\-rn, 58 
Fla. 221; 50 So. 416, it was found that a city coun-
cilman violated his public obligation by selling his 
off'icial influence or ·vote to influence the city 
council. Such, the Court said, constituted miscon-
duct in office. There the committed act related to 
the office held by the incumbent. 
The case of In re Carpenter, 50 N. Y. S. R. 631; 
21 N. Y. S. 351, involved the removal from office of 
a justice of the peace, mainly on the ground that 
he used his office to punish a constable u;ho was 
a:lleged to have shot another, 'lohich alle.rJalion the 
justice knew 1l'as false; W'"hich 'Ye-re acts done in pur-
suance of and in conrse of official conduct. 
In the two l\fissouri cases cited, the defendants re-
1noved failed or 11 r.o! Pr'ffd f o pe r{or1n d·uties con-
nected 'vith their office. 
But the main case as to thi~ point cited and relied 
on hy the State i~ thP c::tse of 
State v. Fratrr, 198 ''T a.sh. 675; 89 Par.. 
(2rl) 1046. 
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It is well particularly to notice this I case. The de-
fendant there was mayor of the city of Bremerton. 
He, with another, was charged with the crime of 
conspiracy to establish and operate in the city 
gambling games, games of chance, gambling de-
vices and to sell lottery tickets. The defendant was 
convicted. There too after conviction quo warranto 
proceedings were brought to re1nove the rnayor 
from office. With resp~ect thereto the Supreme 
Court said: 
''The relator contends that his conviction 
of the crime of conspiracy to violate the 
gambling la·w·s of this State does not con-
stitute malfeasance in office in that the 
crime of \vhich he was convicted did not 
affect the performance on h1s part of the 
duties of mayor. He cites State ex rel. 
Martin v. Burnquist, 141 ~[inn. 308, 170 
N. \V. 201, 609; I\1echem on Public Offi-
cerB, 2!JO, Par. 457, and Throop on Public 
Officers, 363, Par. 367, and other eases of 
like import~ all of which support the fol-
lo,ring rule announced in . the last men-
tioned authorit-y: '"\Vhere the constitution 
or a statute authorizes a removal for offi-
cial misconduct, or misfeasance!, miscon-
durt, or maladministration in office, or 
siini.lar 8(~tR of nuRbehavior in office, the 
genera.] rule is, that the officer can be l'P-
moved only f.or acts or omissions relating 
to tl1e performance of his official duties, 
not for those which affpct his ~eneral 
moral character,. or his conduct as a ma.n of 
business, apart fron1 his eonduct as an offi-
cer. In such a case, as a learned judge has 
remarked, it 1s neee~ssary to separate the 
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character of the n1an fron1 the character of 
the officer'.'' 
The Court admitted the f1}rce of, and approved, the 
rule contained in the citations, nevertheless held 
that the defendant Frater was guilty of miscon-
duct in office, for the reason that under the statute 
(citing it) he as mayor u'as the superintendent of 
the department of public safety and was the· official 
head of the city gove~rn·ment; tha.t it was his official 
and sworn duty to compel obedience to ·the ordin-
ances of the city and the statutes of the State; that 
when he conspired to introduce gambling in the city 
he violated the pr-incipal 1.and most important duty 
of the office to which he ha·d been elected, and ftor 
that reason, his conviction was held malfeasance in 
office. The conditions or circumstances under which 
it thus was held that th~ defendant Frater was 
~JUilty of misconduct in office are here not pres.ent. 
The defendant Burke wa.s not, as there, charged 
'vith the superintendency ''of the department of 
public safety'' or a.s the ''official head of the city 
government,'' or as the head oflthe county gov-ern-
ment. In the Frater case, it further 'viii be noted 
that the defendant there 'vas also by information in 
the criminal case charged with a cons-piracy ente~red 
into by him and ~1nothPr to persuadP, and prornises 
made of a monetary re,vard~ to induce the prosecut-
ing attorney, ''in his official caparitv not to enforce 
the gamblin~ laws of the State of Washington with 
respect to the ~ames and devices to be ;operated by 
the defendant Frater and another.'' No such con-
ifitjon or eircumstHnCt? is here present~ and hence, 
the Frater cas·e in essentials 'va~ different from 
the Burke case. 
Thr broad e01ntention ma.de here by thP State is, 
that beenn~e thP defendant Burke in the r.riminal 
rnsr "ras '' ronvirted of a felony and sentenced to 
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imprisonment in the State prison,'' he ipso facto 
forfeited all rights to the office of justice of the 
p·eace :and ipso facto W:as removed from his office, but 
refusing to do so the State found it necessary to 
bring an independent action, or p·roceeding in quo 
warranto to accomplish such removal. 
POINT III. 
(Page 18 of Counsel's Brief). 
'rhere they say that ''the legislature has provided 
~hat an ap.peal from a judgment of ouster i92 quo 
11Ja'rranto proceedings should not stay the execution 
of judgment of ouster,'' and particularly refer to 
Section 104-41-17. The sect~on there provides 
that: 
'' '\1lere the defendant is adjudged g·uilty 
of usurping, intruding into, or unla\vfully 
holding public office, civil or n1ilitary, with-
in this State, the exooutjon of the judg-
ment shall not be stayed hy an appeal." 
Wh·at that section has to do with the case in hand 
is difficult to perceive. The section, as will h<' 
noted, is under Chapter 41 relating to appeals under 
the Code of C·ivil Procedure from final judgn1ents 
in la.w and equity cases. The section has nothing 
whatever to do with a.ppe·als under the code of 
. oriminal procedure and as provided by Section 
105-40-9. Nor does the eode of civil procedure in 
any respect or in any particular restrict or n1odify 
appeals under the code of criminal procedure. 
lienee, the provisions of fhe one may not be rea(l 
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into the other. They both are separate and dis-
tinct from each other. 
ln the next place, the defendant here, on any pro-
ceeding brought for that purpose has not yet been 
'~adjudged guilty of usurping, intru{lii1g 
into or unlawfully holding public office, 
civil or military, within the State.'' 
Had here a proper action in the district court in 
quo warranto proceedi.ngs or otherwise been 
brought to remove the defendant Burke from office 
and ·a. judgment therein rendered decreeing that the 
defendant had usurped, intruded into or unlaw-
fully held a public office, towit, the office of justice 
of the peace, a civil action, as admitted by the 
State, let it be conceded no stay of judgment on 
:1ppeal to the Supreme Oourt could under Section 
104-41-17 be had. But,that is not this case. 
The question here presented before this Court is 
V{hether the complaint or petition of the State in 
relation o.f the attorney gteneral states sufficient 
facts to constitute a cause of action in quo war-
ranto at the time of the filing of the petition to 
justify a remo'val of the defendant from the office 
of justice of the peace. That is the question to be 
determined and decided on the defendant's de-
murrer and motion to strike the complaint or peti-
tion filed in this C~ourt, and not the question as to 
·whether a defendant in a civil or quo warranto pro-
~eeding, adjudged guilty of usurping or unlawfully 
holding a public office, ha.s or has nJot, p~ending an 
appeal from the judgment, the right to a stay of 
the execution of the judgment. Let the case before 
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the Court ue decided and not another, not before 
the Court. 
We thus submit this action for removal is pre-
Jnature and not maintainab~e until the appeal in the 
criminal action is dispos,ed of and then only on an 
affirmance of the judgment in that case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLARD HANSON, 
STEW ART M. HANSON, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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